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A Long, Strange Trip: 
My First Year Challenging the Constitutionality of 
Obamacare 
Ilya Shapiro
*
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When I joined the Cato Institute in September 2007, I didn’t real-
ly know what I was getting myself into.  It was my sixth job in just 
over four years out of law school — after clerking, a political campaign, 
two large firms, and a short stint as a rule-of-law adviser in Iraq — and 
now it was time for something completely different.  The life of a 
think tank scholar is odd enough: you’re not an academic, but not a 
political player or activist either.  The life of a think tanker specializ-
ing in constitutional law is stranger still, particularly given my respon-
sibility for Cato’s burgeoning amicus brief program.  Sometimes I get 
to pretend I’m a scholar, sometimes an attorney, and sometimes a 
pundit.  The job takes on all these aspects at different times, but it’s 
nothing like what I had experienced in my young legal career; I’m no 
longer really a lawyer but I do play one on TV.1  Whereas the role of a 
judicial clerk or law firm associate is well defined, the only set part of 
my current job description is that I have the privilege of editing the 
Cato Supreme Court Review — and that’s more guidance than any of 
my colleagues get! 
As it turns out, the open-ended nature of the job, and the podium 
that a Cato affiliation provides, placed me near the heart of the legal-
                                                                                                                           
 
* Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute, and Editor-in-Chief, Cato Su-
preme Court Review; J.D., University of Chicago Law School; M.Sc., London School of Econom-
ics; A.B., Princeton University.  Thanks to Jonathan Blanks, Trevor Burrus, and Michael Wilt 
for timely research assistance, and to Richard Albert for commenting on an earlier draft.  I also 
owe a debt of gratitude to Randy Barnett, Richard Epstein, Bob Levy, and Roger Pilon for 
providing the foundations of my constitutional thinking and inspiration to do battle in this arena.  
If I hadn’t been following in the footsteps of these giants, the journey this article covers would 
have been short and insignificant. 
 1 See, for example, my appearance on The Colbert Report (Comedy Central July 8, 2010), 
http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/340923/july-08-2010/automatics-for-the-
people---ilya-shapiro---jackie-hilly.  
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political storm that the latest attempt to reform the American health 
care system has become.  I went from not being sure of which legal 
topics to research in 2010 — beyond generally watching the Supreme 
Court — to spending over half my time on one issue.  I went from not 
knowing very much about health care law or policy to knowing (a bit) 
more but realizing that it’s largely irrelevant to the constitutional de-
bate.  Perhaps most importantly, I went from a general understanding 
of provisions like the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper 
Clause to seeing how that high theory plays out in front-page news 
stories. 
Similarly, as far as those diverse roles think tankers play, I have 
been called upon to synthesize and marshal complex legal ideas for 
academic, judicial, and popular consumption.  Through several briefs, 
dozens of debates and panels, countless blog posts and media inter-
views, and now a law review article, I have been living and breathing 
the “Obamacare” constitutional debate.2  The process has exercised 
my analytical and communicative abilities in novel ways and given me 
a unique perspective on the legal challenges this legislation spawned.  
It’s also exposed me to every conceivable argument against my posi-
tion — and to an evolution in points of emphasis. 
And so, in writing this article I thought it would be more instruc-
tive to cover the constitutional issues attending the Obamacare law-
suits through the prism of how I’ve experienced them — rather than 
simply evaluating the law and showing why the individual mandate, at 
least, exceeds Congress’s constitutional authority.  After all, the ar-
guments pro and con are well and thoroughly presented in the briefs 
and judicial opinions in the various cases.  Were I merely to analyze 
the current state of those cases, this article would be overtaken by 
events before it even hit the presses.   
But neither is this meant to be a foundational article of the sort 
Georgetown law professor Randy Barnett recently published to ex-
plain why the individual mandate is, among other defects, an uncons-
                                                                                                                           
 2 “Obamacare” refers of course to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001), as amended by the 
Health and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).  I use the 
term because most people colloquially refer to it that way–though those who support it use 
quotation marks–in large part because it’s much easier to say than “PPACA,” “Affordable 
Care Act,” or any other more technical term.  While thought in some quarters to be pejorative, 
I’ve never understood how that’s the case (unless said with a sneer, but by that standard any-
thing can be pejorative).  Even the leading academic supporters of Obamacare’s constitutionali-
ty, such as Yale law professors Akhil Amar and Jack Balkin (who both make cameo appear-
ances toward the end of this article), say “Obamacare.”  The one semi-accurate criticism I’ve 
heard is that the law was mostly written by Congress, not the White House–for which the presi-
dent got plenty of heat from the Left.  But that just means it would be better to call it Pelosi-
Reid-care, which presumably is no more or less pejorative.  In any event, that ship has sailed.   
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titutional “commandeering of the people.”3  I’m afraid I break no new 
doctrinal ground here, letting my previous court filings and commen-
tary speak for themselves.   
No, echoing any endeavor where the process matters as much as 
the product, I instead aim to interweave enough of the legal substance 
here with a narrative designed to keep the story moving.  While no 
“Hearts of Darkness” — the film about the production of “Apocalypse 
Now,” subtitled “A Filmmaker’s Apocalypse” — this journey has at 
least shown me the horror of unchecked federal power.  It’s a journey 
that has still far to run of course, but at the very least we have reached 
the end of the beginning. 
What follows, then, is an account of my (first) year battling Ob-
amacare. 
II.  PRELUDE TO A LEGAL ODYSSEY 
In late 2009, as the debate in Congress over how to reform the 
health care system raged — remember how Sen. Joseph Lieberman (I-
CT) killed the public option, then Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-
NV) kept the Senate in session through Christmas Eve to pass Ob-
amacare on a straight party-line vote — my attention was elsewhere.  
Yes, I remember cringing when House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s re-
sponse to a question about the constitutional concerns being raised by 
the individual mandate was, “Are you serious?”4  (The former Speak-
er presumably believes that the Constitution is merely the refuge of 
the scoundrel who doesn’t have any policy arguments to make.)  But 
my focus was on a different constitutional issue, the question of 
whether — and, just as importantly, how — the individual right to keep 
and bear arms recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller5 would be 
applied to the states.  The Supreme Court was hearing McDonald v. 
Chicago6 in March — and would decide the case in favor of the would-
be gun owners at the end of June — so I was doing all I could to push 
extension of the right to armed self-defense via the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause.  Resurrecting this doctrine was more than just an 
academic point; using Privileges or Immunities instead of substantive 
due process would be more faithful to constitutional text and open the 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance 
Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010). 
 4 See, e.g., Matt Cover, When Asked Where the Constitution Authorizes Congress to Order 
Americans to Buy Health Insurance, Pelosi Says: 'Are You Serious?', CNSNEWS.COM (Oct. 22, 
2009), http://www.cnsnews.com/node/55971. 
 5 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 6 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
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opportunity to strengthen protections for long-slighted economic li-
berties and property rights.7 
I mention my McDonald work not to publicize it anew, but be-
cause that case put me in closer contact with Randy Barnett, who had 
quite literally written the book on the proper way to interpret the 
Constitution’s lost passages.8  I already knew Randy and his scholar-
ship fairly well — he had given a landmark lecture on the Constitu-
tion’s libertarian roots at our 2008 Constitution Day conference, 
which became a key article in the journal I edit9 — but engaging with 
him on McDonald (in which debate he also prominently figured) set 
the stage for collaboration on Obamacare. 
Indeed, one of the first events that began to crystallize my think-
ing about the constitutional issues attending Obamacare was the pub-
lication on December 9, 2009, of a Heritage Foundation memoran-
dum that Randy co-authored, entitled “Why the Personal Mandate to 
Buy Health Insurance Is Unprecedented and Unconstitutional.”10  
This paper argued that the proposed health care law “takes congres-
sional power and control to a striking new level. . . .  An individual 
mandate to enter into a contract with or buy a particular product from 
a private party, with tax penalties to enforce it, is unprecedented — not 
just in scope but in kind — and unconstitutional as a matter of first 
principles and under any reasonable reading of judicial precedents.”11  
Moreover, “if this precedent is established, Congress would have the 
unlimited power to regulate, prohibit, or mandate any or all activities 
in the United States.  Such a doctrine would abolish any limit on fed-
eral power and alter the fundamental relationship of the national gov-
ernment to the states and the people.”12  While this line of argument 
was not universally accepted — even UCLA’s Eugene Volokh, among 
the most libertarian law professors, expressed skepticism at the forum 
Heritage held to release the paper of whether the Supreme Court 
would go along13 — it was a serious shot across Obamacare’s bow. 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See generally Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Keeping Pandora's Box Sealed: Privileges 
or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending the Right to Keep and Bear 
Arms to the States, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2010). 
 8 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2004). 
 9 Randy E. Barnett, Annual B. Kenneth Simon Lecture: Is the Constitution Libertarian?, 
2008-2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 9 (2009). 
 10 Randy Barnett, Nathaniel Stewart & Todd Gaziano, Why the Personal Mandate to Buy 
Health Insurance Is Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, EXEC. SUMMARY LEGAL MEM. NO. 49, 
DEC. 9, 2009, available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2009/pdf/lm_0049.pdf.  
 11 Id. at 2. 
 12 Id. at 6. 
 13 Eugene Volokh, Remarks at The Heritage Foundation Panel: Is the Personal Mandate 
to Buy Health Insurance Constitutional? (Dec. 9, 2009).  
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Notwithstanding the percolating constitutional arguments being 
made against the individual mandate, however, Obamacare passed 
the Senate.  But an outcry arose about provisions that had been in-
serted at the last minute to appease recalcitrant (Democratic) sena-
tors: the Nebraska Compromise for Ben Nelson, the Louisiana Pur-
chase for Mary Landrieu, some Florida Gator-Aid for Bill Nelson.  A 
few weeks later, Republican Scott Brown won a stunning special elec-
tion for “Ted Kennedy’s seat” in Massachusetts.14  Many observers, 
myself included, hailed the Brown win as Obamacare’s death knell; 
surely such a loss in the bluest of blue states would make Democrats 
reconsider their suicidal push for an already-unpopular piece of legis-
lation.  
But no, Pelosi was true to her word in being willing to sacrifice 
her House majority for the health care bill.  Even without the power 
to cut the state-specific carve-outs and other problematic provisions — 
Scott Brown’s filibuster-enabling forty-first Republican vote pre-
vented the legislation’s return to the Senate — House Democrats 
passed and, on March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.15  Immediately dubbed 
Obamacare, the law is widely considered to be the most significant 
federal legislation since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 
1965.16   
That same day, however, the attorneys general of Virginia and 
Florida filed separate lawsuits challenging Obamacare’s constitutio-
nality, with 12 states joining Florida’s suit: Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington.17  Seven more states, plus the 
National Federation of Independent Business and two individuals, 
would join the multi-state suit when Florida amended its complaint: 
Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Mississippi, Nevada, and North 
Dakota.18  Another six would join when newly elected executive offi-
cials assumed office in January 2011: Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Ohio, Wis-
                                                                                                                           
 14 Full disclosure: In my personal capacity, I provided some unpaid legal advice to the 
Brown campaign. 
 15 See supra note 2. 
 16 See, e.g., Richard Adams, Joe Biden: ‘This is a big fucking deal,’ RICHARD ADAMS’S 
BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010, 17:13 GMT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/richard-adams-
blog/2010/mar/23/joe-biden-obama-big-fucking-deal-overheard. 
 17 See Complaint, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV-
EMT (N.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/MRAY-
83TKWB/$file/HealthCareReformLawsuit.pdf. 
 18 See Amended Complaint, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-
00091-RV-EMT (N.D. Fla. May 14, 2010), available at http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/ 
WF/JFAO-85FNM9/$file/Complaint.pdf. 
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consin, Wyoming.19  The Hill newspaper asked a variety of commenta-
tors whether this multi-state lawsuit was “a real legal challenge or a 
political stunt” and I concluded my response by explaining that “if the 
challenges to this health care ‘reform’ fail, nobody will ever be able to 
claim plausibly that the Constitution limits federal power.”20 
Contrary to many pundits’ dismissal of these challenges as legally 
frivolous and political sour grapes, these were real lawsuits, with se-
rious lawyers behind them.  Virginia’s solicitor general Duncan Get-
chell was the longtime head of appellate litigation at McGuire Woods 
and former nominee to the Fourth Circuit, for example, while the 
multi-state case was led by Baker Hostetler’s David Rivkin initially 
and then by former U.S. solicitor general Paul Clement on appeal.  It 
was difficult to predict how courts would react, however, because the 
new health care law was and is unprecedented — quite literally, with-
out legal precedent — both in its regulatory scope and its expansion of 
federal authority over states and individuals. 
As the Congressional Budget Office said in 1994, “The govern-
ment has never required people to buy any good or service as a condi-
tion of lawful residence in the United States.”21  Nor has it ever said 
that every man and woman faces a civil penalty for declining to partic-
ipate in the marketplace.  Never have courts had to consider such a 
breathtaking assertion of raw power under the guise of regulating 
commerce — not even at the height of the New Deal, when the Su-
preme Court ratified Congress’s regulation of wheat grown for home 
consumption on the awkward theory that such behavior, when aggre-
gated nationally, affected interstate commerce.  Even in that case, 
Wickard v. Filburn, the government claimed “merely” the power to 
regulate what farmers grew, not to mandate that people become far-
mers, much less to force people to purchase agricultural products.22 
Put simply, neither the Commerce Clause (alone or as executed 
via the Necessary and Proper Clause) nor the taxing power, nor any 
other provision the government — or anyone — has been able to identi-
                                                                                                                           
 19 See Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t. of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV-EMT (N.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2011), available at 
http://aca-litigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/Motion+to+amend+complaint.pdf; Second Amend-
ed Complaint, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV-EMT 
(N.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://aca-litigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/Sec-
ond+amended+complaint.pdf. 
 20 Sydelle Moore, The Big Question: Is the Healthcare Lawsuit a Legal Issue or a Stunt?, 
THE HILL’S CONGRESS BLOG (Mar. 24, 2010, 10:13 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/politics/88793-the-big-question-is-the-healthcare-lawsuit-a-stunt?page=3 (comments of Ilya 
Shapiro). 
 21 Cong. Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health 
Insurance 1 (1994).   
 22 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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fy provides a constitutional warrant for an “economic mandate” of the 
kind contemplated here.  Not even, as House Judiciary Committee 
Chairman John Conyers suggested, the “good and welfare clause.”23 
Obamacare’s opponents raised several other constitutional 
points.  These include: infringing on state sovereignty; commandeer-
ing state officials to enforce federal law; forcing states to enter into 
coercive (Medicaid) contracts; and violating the spending power — all 
tied to the Tenth Amendment.  The individual mandate, among other 
issues, has also been raised in lawsuits filed on behalf of individuals, 
associations, classes, and other non-state plaintiffs.  For example, the 
Thomas More Law Center, a Christian public interest law firm, also 
filed suit while the ink was still drying on President Obama’s signa-
ture.  More than 20 lawsuits would be brought — and more are no 
doubt coming regarding as-yet unexplored parts of the law — trigger-
ing an intense legal and political debate about the very first principles 
of our republic.24 
III.  THE DEBATE CHALLENGE 
Not that you would know that any question about Obamacare’s 
constitutionality existed by asking the nation’s legal faculties.  About 
a week after the first lawsuits were filed, I came across an article in 
the Seattle Times documenting a panel on the new health care law that 
the respected University of Washington Law School held.25  Four pro-
fessors took the stage, none expressing any constitutional doubts.  
Liberal bloggers gleefully reported that the organizers “can’t find an-
yone” to argue against the legislation.26 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Ilya Shapiro, Individual Mandate Is Constitutional – If You Rewrite the Constitution, 
CATO @ LIBERTY (Mar. 23, 2010, 11:22 AM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/individual-mandate-
is-constitutional-if-you-rewrite-the-constitution/. As I wrote in that blog post, “even if you 
excuse Conyers’s casual use of language, what he probably means–the General Welfare Clause 
of Article I, Section 8–is not a better answer.”  Id.  That clause does not grant Congress any 
new authority, but instead limits Congress’s use of the powers enumerated elsewhere in that 
section to legislation that promotes the general (as opposed to regional or parochial) welfare.   
 24 For the latest on all the various Obamacare lawsuits, see generally Health Care Law-
suits, healthcarelawsuits.org and ACA Litigation Blog, acalitigationblog.blogspot.com. 
 25 Nick Perry, UW Panelists Say Lawsuits Challenging Health Bill Lack Merit, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2011483297_ 
healthdebate31m.html. 
 26 Zachary Roth, Debate Planners Can’t Find Anyone to Argue that Health Reform Is Un-
constitutional, TPM (Mar. 31, 2010, 10:09 AM), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/ 
2010/03/debate_planners_cant_find_anyone_to_argue_that_hea.php; see also Zaid Jilani, College 
Debate Organizers Unable to Any Law Professors to Argue Health Reform Is Unconstitutional, 
THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 31, 2010, 12;16 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/2010/03/31/college-debate-
health/. 
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Well, I read this, and thought, ok, the academy is quite left-wing, 
but surely these people can identify the leading libertarian and con-
servative scholars, people like Randy Barnett and Richard Epstein, or 
even my boss, Cato’s vice president for legal affairs, Roger Pilon.  
And didn’t the Federalist Society have a lawyers’ chapter in Seattle — 
let alone a student chapter at UW law school?  Surely it wouldn’t have 
been too hard to find someone to take the position that the govern-
ment can’t make you buy stuff.27   
I typed up a quick note about this humorous episode for Cato’s 
blog, concluding melodramatically that if none of the “big shots” were 
available, that I would debate the constitutionality of Obamacare 
“anytime, anywhere” so long as my expenses were covered.28  My me-
dia colleagues were so enthused by my blog post that they asked me 
to record a sort of public service announcement making the same dec-
laration.29  This 30-second video went viral, and the rest is what is de-
tailed below. 
My first two debates came at the end of April in Chicago.  I had a 
dry run of sorts at John Marshall Law School — though my “oppo-
nent,” Andrea Kovach from the Sargent Shriver National Center on 
Poverty Law, turned out to be a health policy activist and not a consti-
tutional lawyer — before a much-anticipated homecoming at my alma 
mater, the University of Chicago Law School.  A crowd of 75 people 
watched me take on my former professor, David Strauss.  David was 
gracious to me personally, complimenting my achievements and say-
ing that I was an exemplary alumnus, but he was utterly contemp-
tuous of my arguments.  Libertarians were “outside the mainstream” 
and my position on federal power was antiquated, representing an 
outmoded desire to return to a long-eclipsed jurisprudence that was 
incompatible with modern society.  Strauss’s refusal to confront se-
riously my legal position detracted from his presentation.  Not surpri-
singly, then, he got the brunt of the difficult inquiries during Q & A — 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See Ilya Shapiro, U.S. Can’t Force People to Buy Stuff, CNN.COM (Dec. 13, 2010), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-13/opinion/shapiro.court.mandate.health_1_individual-mandate-
health-insurance-economic-activity?_s=PM:OPINION. 
 28 Ilya Shapiro, Will Debate Constitutionality of Obamacare Anytime, Anywhere, CATO @ 
LIBERTY (Mar. 31, 2010, 3:02 pm), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/will-debate-constitutionality-
of-obamacare-anytime-anywhere/. 
 29 See Ilya Shapiro, Ilya Shapiro Accepts Challenge to Debate Obamacare, YOUTUBE 
(April 1, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_xbawZ3BtGc; Ilya Shapiro, More on the 
(Un) Constitutionality of Obamacare, CATO @ LIBERTY (Apr. 2, 2010, 12:53 PM), 
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/more-on-the-unconstitutionality-of-obamacare/. 
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even from students who would otherwise agree with him — and the 
consensus seemed to be that I won the debate.30 
Next I journeyed to Oberlin College in the bucolic Cleveland 
suburbs.  While I had no debate opponent there — Oberlin lacks a law 
school, for one thing — I was honored to be part of the school’s Ronald 
Reagan Political Lectureship Series.  And also to meet Milton Fried-
man’s granddaughter, who is, unsurprisingly, an economics major.  
The arguments I made there were still very much a work in progress, 
but I had certainly honed my main Commerce Clause point: that there 
was no legal precedent for the federal government to mandate, as op-
posed to regulate (Wickard; the Civil Rights Cases)31 or prohibit 
(Gonzales v. Raich)32 economic activity.  The Supreme Court may well 
provide one, but that would be breaking new ground. 
I then made my first-ever visit to Utah, to speak alongside Attor-
ney General Mark Shurtleff at the annual Utah Taxpayers Associa-
tion conference.  The trip was most notable for its brevity: I was away 
from home for 30 hours, of which about five were awake and non-
traveling.  I also made the acquaintance of state Rep. John Dougall, a 
passionate advocate for federalism but also one who recognizes the 
difference between that and nullification. 
Two days later, May 13, I returned to my old stomping grounds in 
Jackson, Mississippi (where I’d clerked), for a wide-ranging discussion 
of Obamacare’s effects on the medical field, the business community, 
and the state government.33  It was the first time I’d ever been flown in 
to moderate an event rather than be a featured speaker.  It turns out 
that my hosts, the local Federalist Society chapter and the Mississippi 
Center for Public Policy, had invited me to frame the debate.  About 
140 people came out for this luncheon at the Capitol Club, including, 
to my great honor, Judge E. Grady Jolly, at whose knee I learned 
most of what I know about legal process and the proper role of a 
judge.  There wasn’t too much disagreement on the panel, but the 
varied perspectives distinguished the event from many that I had done 
and would do. 
It was also about this time that a new line of discussion opened 
up: Heartland Institute health care policy analyst Greg Scandlen had 
                                                                                                                           
 30 To watch the debate, see Is Obamacare Constitutional?, http://www.megavideo.com/? 
v=GO8JFMWN. 
 31 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
 32 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 33 Ilya Shapiro, Quarterly Luncheon 5-13-2010 - Ilya Shapiro Part 1, YOU TUBE (May 14, 
2010), http://www.youtube.com/user/MississippiPolicy#p/u/9/CUQjXfcD3_Y (first of five seg-
ments). 
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reviewed all of Obamacare and found that the 2,700 page law lacked a 
severability clause.34  That revelation didn’t necessarily mean that if a 
court overturned one piece, the entire piece of legislation would fall, 
but it was an important point that would gain in significance as litiga-
tion proceeded. 
Two weeks later, as we approached the Memorial Day weekend 
that begins a seasonal reprieve from academic speaking engagements, 
I went to Seattle to debate Obamacare at the place that started this 
whole exercise: the University of Washington Law School.  Professor 
Stewart Jay was my antagonist in an event sponsored by a bevy of 
student organizations — the Federalist Society, College Republicans, 
Students for Liberty, and College Democrats, among others — and he 
was a fitting one, with shoulder-length gray hair, wire-rimmed glasses, 
and Birkenstocks.  Jay accused me of avoiding the legal substance — 
that my arguments consisted of political disagreements and “rhetori-
cal flourishes” — and of asking courts to make policy rather than defer 
to Congress.  It was all a bit rich coming from someone whose argu-
ments focused on standing and ripeness and whose presentation cen-
tered on the need to reform a broken health care system.  Indeed, Jay 
repeatedly criticized my unwillingness to tackle the issue of “spiraling 
premiums” — which I eventually addressed, though I had been under 
the impression that the debate concerned constitutional law, not why 
we need to reform the health care system.35  
IV.  WRITING DOWN MY THOUGHTS 
My public events concluded for the time being — so I could spend 
the summer analyzing the opinions from the end of the Supreme 
Court term, commenting on Elena Kagan’s nomination and confirma-
tion process,36 and editing our Supreme Court Review — my Obama-
care focus shifted toward expressing my arguments in written form.  
In the days and weeks after Obamacare’s enactment, Cato had devel-
oped some internal memoranda — both on the procedural and subs-
tantive aspects of the states’ legal challenges — which we had shared 
with both the Virginia and Florida legal teams.  Then Health Affairs, 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Read the Fine Print, INVESTORS.COM (May 18, 2010, 6:58 PM), http://www.inves-
tors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article.aspx?id=534458. 
 35 To watch the debate, see The Second Health Care Reform Debate, UWTV (May 27, 
2010), http://www.uwtv.org/programs/displayevent.aspx?rID=31653&fID=6910. 
 36 Which, of course, had its own Obamacare moment, when Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) 
famously asked whether Congress could require people to have three servings of fruits and 
vegetables every day.  See, e.g., Sallie James & Ilya Shapiro, Elena Kagan Balances Your Diet, 
THE DAILY CALLER (July 2, 2010, 12:09 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2010/07/02/elena-kagan-
balances-your-diet/.  
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the preeminent health care policy journal, asked me to participate in a 
point-counterpoint (to the envy of colleagues who actually knew 
something about health care policy).  The public legal debate focused 
almost exclusively on Congress’s power to regulate interstate com-
merce, so the salient part of my 2,500-word essay ran as follows: 
Although the Court has rejected nearly all Commerce Clause 
challenges since the New Deal, two such lawsuits have been suc-
cessful.  In 1995 the Court struck down a law prohibiting the pos-
session of guns near schools because it was not “part of a larger 
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme 
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”  
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).  In seeking to 
distinguish “between what is truly national and what is truly lo-
cal,” the Court limited the reach of the commerce power to ex-
clude activity that is not directly economic in nature, even if it 
creates indirect economic effects.  Id. at 567-68. 
Similarly, the Court struck down the Violence Against Women 
Act because the gender-motivated violence it regulated had only 
an “attenuated” economic effect.  United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 615 (2000).  The Court rejected the idea that Congress 
could “regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated 
impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, pro-
duction, transit, or consumption.”  Id. 
These cases demonstrate that the Court recognizes that some 
noneconomic activities are outside the Commerce Clause’s 
scope.  As Justice Kennedy explained, “Were the Federal Gov-
ernment to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional 
state concern . . . the boundaries between the spheres of federal 
and state authority would blur and political responsibility would 
become illusory.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring). 
This precedent, taken at face value, suggests that courts should 
find the individual mandate unconstitutional.  To do otherwise 
would be to expand the Commerce Clause to regulate economic 
inactivity — something the Supreme Court has never done. 
To be sure, there are situations in which the government may 
force individuals to engage in a transaction or activity.  Most not-
ably, it can require hotels and restaurants to serve all patrons.  
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).  But nobody has to 
operate a hotel or restaurant, or purchase lodging or food (and 
individuals are not commercial enterprises).  These holdings may 
40 FIU Law Review [6:29 
arguably support requiring insurers to insure people without re-
gard to preexisting conditions — with the likely effect that all 
health insurance companies would instantly cease operations 
(and thus nationalization of healthcare) — but they do not sup-
port forcing individuals to buy policies.37 
That article set the stage for the initial round of briefing in the 
first major Obamacare lawsuit, at the motion-to-dismiss stage in the 
Virginia case.  My colleagues and I decided that Cato needed to be 
involved here — the first time ever at the district court level — because 
the “rocket docket” of the Eastern District of Virginia would no 
doubt provide the first legal ruling in the matter.  In an amicus brief 
(technically a “memorandum”) joined by the Competitive Enterprise 
Institute and Randy Barnett, we argued that the case was not about 
health care at all, but about federalism: 
In other words, this case presents the Court with “the arduous . . 
. task of marking the proper line of partition between the author-
ity of the general and that of the State governments.”  The Fede-
ralist No. 37, at 227 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961).  At issue is the constitutionality of the individual health 
insurance mandate — the requirement that individuals obtain a 
government-approved health insurance policy or pay a penalty — 
and potentially, given the lack of a severability clause, the entire 
health care reform scheme.  Congress identified the Commerce 
Clause as the source of its authority, a position the Government 
now asserts in its Motion to Dismiss.  Because Virginia and other 
amici persuasively refute that argument, we confine ourselves 
here to explaining the fundamental flaws in the Government’s 
fall-back positions on the Necessary and Proper Clause and tax-
ing power. 
Neither of the Government’s cursory arguments — comprising 9 
pages of a 40 page memorandum that mainly relies on jurisdic-
tional and Commerce Clause claims — legitimizes the individual 
mandate.  The Necessary and Proper Clause is not an indepen-
dent source of congressional power; instead, it enables Congress 
to carry out its enumerated powers or ends by means that are 
“appropriate” (Chief Justice Marshall’s term for “necessary”) 
and “plainly adapted to a [constitutional] end” (his definition of 
“proper”).  M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Ilya Shapiro, State Suits Against Health Reform are Well Grounded in Law—and Pose 
Serious Challenges, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1229, 1230 (June 2010) (endnotes inserted into text as 
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(1819).  Forcing someone to buy a product from a third party is 
not an “appropriate” or “proper” method “for carrying into Ex-
ecution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States.”  U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  Even for matters within the scope of an 
enumerated power, Congress may not enact laws that are not 
“plainly adapted” to further an enumerated end, or that do so at 
the expense of the rights reserved to the States or the people un-
der the Tenth Amendment.  The Supreme Court enforced such 
limits in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and should 
enforce such limits here, too. 
Similarly, the individual mandate is not a tax — its non-
compliance penalty is a civil fine — but if it were, it would be un-
constitutional because it is neither apportioned (if a direct tax) 
nor uniform (if an excise tax).  Moreover, Congress cannot use 
the taxing power as a backdoor means of regulating an activity 
unless such regulation is authorized elsewhere in the Constitu-
tion.  Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37-38 (1922). 
As the Supreme Court recognized almost 150 years ago, “[n]o 
graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one which 
more nearly concerns the rights of the whole,” than the Govern-
ment’s unconstitutional assertion of power against its own citi-
zens.  Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 1, 118-19 (1866) (granting ha-
beas corpus petition).  The motion to dismiss this lawsuit must be 
denied.38 
Thus our efforts shifted to the Necessary and Proper Clause — which I 
began to see as the ultimate battleground where all this would be de-
cided — and the taxing power. 
Coincidentally, a month later the New York Times reported that 
the government was shifting its argument away from the Commerce 
Clause and towards “the power to lay and collect taxes.”39  This was a 
remarkable development; for months all “serious” politicians and 
academics had considered the Commerce Clause justification to be a 
no-brainer, but now the administration felt the need to go to an emer-
gency back-up.  Indeed, 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Memorandum of the Cato Institute, Competitive Enterprise Institute, and Prof. Randy 
E. Barnett as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff’s Opposition  to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
at 3-4, Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (No. 3:10CV188-HEH). 
 39 Robert Pear, Changing Stance, Administration Now Defends Insurance Mandate as a 
Tax, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/ 
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the law includes 10 detailed findings meant to show that the 
mandate regulates commercial activity important to the nation’s 
economy.  Nowhere does Congress cite its taxing power as a 
source of authority. . . . The law describes the levy on the unin-
sured as a ‘penalty’ rather than a tax.40  
It was not at all clear, therefore, that the taxing power would provide 
any surer footing than the Commerce Clause.  As Randy Barnett put 
it, 
Now there are cases that say (1) when Congress does not invoke 
a specific power for a claim of power, the Supreme Court will 
look for a basis on which to sustain the measure; (2) when Con-
gress does invoke its Tax power, such a claim is not defeated by 
showing the measure would be outside its commerce power if 
enacted as a regulation (though there are some older, never-
reversed precedents pointing the other way), and (3) the Courts 
will not look behind a claim by Congress that a measure is a tax 
with a revenue raising purpose. 
But I have so far seen no case that says (4) when a measure is 
expressly justified in the statute itself as a regulation of com-
merce (as the NYT accurately reports), the courts will look be-
hind that characterization during litigation to ask if it could have 
been justified as a tax, or (5) when Congress fails to include a pe-
nalty among all the “revenue producing” measures in a bill, the 
Court will nevertheless impute a revenue purpose to the meas-
ure. 
Now, of course, the Supreme Court can always adopt these two 
additional doctrines.  It could decide that any measure passed 
and justified expressly as a regulation of commerce is constitu-
tional if it could have been enacted as a tax.  But if it upholds this 
act, it would also have to say that Congress can assert any power 
it wills over individuals so long as it delegates enforcement of the 
penalty to the IRS.41 
That is, the government now essentially argued that if the Commerce 
Clause doesn’t provide limitless federal authority, surely, the taxing 
power did. 
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In any event, a decision came down in the Virginia case at the 
end of a 10-day period during the height of a summer that saw hot 
district court opinions in three cases that were rapidly overshadowing 
the Supreme Court’s upcoming docket.42  On August 2, Judge Henry 
Hudson found that no procedural issue (not even the Anti-Injunction 
Act, the evaluation of which required ruling against the government’s 
taxing power claim) barred Virginia’s lawsuit and denied the govern-
ment’s motion to dismiss, agreeing with our characterization of the 
individual mandate as unprecedented: 
The guiding precedent is informative, but inconclusive.  Never 
before has the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper 
Clause been extended this far.  At this juncture, the court is not 
persuaded that the Secretary has demonstrated a failure to state 
a cause of action with respect to the Commerce Clause element. 43 
And that goes for the government’s arguments generally: 
While this case raises a host of complex constitutional issues, all 
seem to distill to the single question of whether or not Congress 
has the power to regulate — and tax — a citizen’s decision not to 
participate in interstate commerce.  Neither the U.S. Supreme 
Court nor any circuit court of appeals has squarely addressed this 
issue.  No reported case from any federal appellate court has ex-
tended the Commerce Clause or Tax Clause to include the regu-
lation of a person’s decision not to purchase a product, notwith-
standing its effect on interstate commerce.  Given the presence 
of some authority arguably supporting the theory underlying 
each side’s position, this Court cannot conclude at this time stage 
that the Complaint fails to state a cause of action.44 
In other words, at this first, early stage of litigation, Virginia’s lawsuit 
survived and the government had a real fight on its hands.  Just as 
importantly, nobody could any longer claim that the legal challenges 
to Obamacare were frivolous political ploys. 
                                                                                                                           
 42 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (SB 1070, Arizona’s immi-
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motion to dismiss). 
 44 Id. at 615.  
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V.  MORE DEBATES, MORE JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
Toward the end of summer 2010, as Obamacare lawsuits gained 
steam and the new academic year approached, more invitations 
started coming in relating back to my “debate challenge.”  The first 
one I took, after putting the ninth Cato Supreme Court Review to bed, 
was at the University of Virginia on September 8.  The national Fede-
ralist Society office was somewhat anxious about this event because 
UVA would be hosting the national student symposium, but it turned 
out to be a smashing success.  More than 150 people attended a lively 
panel discussion featuring law professors Fred Schauer, Elizabeth 
Magill, and myself, with Julia Mahoney moderating with verve.  It was 
all very well received, particularly my assertion that if the individual 
mandate survives legal challenge, the decision to attend law school 
would be considered an economic activity that Congress could regu-
late.  The attendance was particularly impressive considering that La-
dy Gaga had a concert in Charlottesville that night. 
My next event was a debate against legendary constitutional law 
professor Mark Tushnet at Harvard Law School, my first time appear-
ing there in an official capacity.  This event was hanging by a thread 
for a while — originally I was supposed to have been opposite Akhil 
Amar, then Charles Fried, and then Noah Feldman — but Tushnet 
stepped up to deliver a nice point-counterpoint, while focusing on 
what decisions upholding and striking down the individual mandate 
would mean as a matter of constitutional doctrine.45  Before the de-
bate began, I had a short discussion with first-year law student Joel 
Alicea, who in college had been publisher of the Princeton Tory — 
which I had helped edit in my own college days — and who had just 
published an op-ed refuting the government’s new claim that the indi-
vidual mandate was constitutionally justified as an excise tax.46   
A number of speeches and debates followed at the law schools of 
Loyola University (Chicago), the University of Kansas, and the Uni-
versity of Missouri, and for the Kansas City Federalist Society law-
yers’ chapter.  At the University of Illinois Law School, 175 people (in 
a room that sat 120) saw me elicit an admission from Dan Hamilton 
that the government can indeed require broccoli purchases.  Hamilton 
countered, however, that my arguments threatened food safety regu-
lations, child labor laws, and the like — though I don’t see how the ac-
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tivity/inactivity distinction suggested by existing doctrine threatened 
anything more than one law: Obamacare. 
The travel got so hectic that I ended up completing the first draft 
of Cato’s brief for the summary judgment stage in the Virginia case 
between the hours of 1 and 5 a.m. in a Columbia, Missouri hotel 
room.  Here, we presented a global summary of our position: 
First, although Congress can regulate “economic activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce,” non-economic activi-
ties, including inactivity, are not subject to Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power.  They simply cannot be shoehorned into a regula-
tory scheme under the Necessary and Proper Clause as inter-
preted in the context of the commerce power.  Second, the asser-
tion in this case of the taxing power as associated with the Gen-
eral Welfare Clause also fails in that (a) as a threshold matter, 
the individual mandate is not a tax; (b) if it is a tax, it’s unconsti-
tutional because it is neither apportioned (if a direct tax) nor uni-
form (if an excise tax); and (c) Congress cannot use its taxing 
power as a backdoor means of regulating an activity unless such 
regulation is authorized elsewhere in the Constitution.  Bailey v. 
Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37-38 (1922).  Third, an “eco-
nomic mandate” of the kind at issue here — even if it were 
deemed “necessary” to Congress’s regulatory scheme — consti-
tutes a “commandeering of the people” that is constitutionally 
impermissible because it is not “proper.”47 
This brief was the first instantiation into legal advocacy of Randy 
Barnett’s “commandeering of the people” concept.48  I had had sever-
al conversations with Randy about how Congress’s assertion of regu-
latory authority over interstate commerce via the Necessary and 
Proper Clause may fall not on its necessity — the individual mandate is 
indeed “necessary” for the proper functioning of a regulatory scheme 
that requires health insurers to cover people with preexisting condi-
tions (cabining the issue of whether Congress can expand its own 
powers by creating such a necessity) — but on its propriety.  In this 
latest brief, we planted our flag on that “proper” prong. 
The electrons had barely cooled on our submission, however, 
when the first district court ruling on Obamacare’s constitutional me-
rits came down in the Eastern District of Michigan.49  Judge George 
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Steeh dismissed the Thomas More Law Center’s challenge to the in-
dividual mandate, but spent scant space on the Commerce Clause ar-
guments, on which hundreds of pages had by this point been filed in 
these cases by top lawyers, legal experts, and academics.  After grant-
ing that the plaintiffs had standing and that the case was ripe for adju-
dication — and rejecting the government’s taxing power claims — Steeh 
used fewer than five pages responding to the plaintiffs’ arguments, 
half of which recited existing doctrine.50  And the novel conclusion we 
gained from this curt disposition is that Congress can now regulate 
people’s “economic decisions,” as well as do anything that is part of a 
“broader regulatory scheme.”51  If the Supreme Court eventually 
upholds that kind of reasoning, again, nobody would ever be able to 
claim plausibly that the Constitution limits federal power.   
Indeed, finding the individual mandate constitutional would be 
the first interpretation of the Commerce Clause to permit the re-
quirement that individuals engage in economic activity.  The federal 
government would then have wide authority to require Americans to 
engage in activities of its choosing, from eating spinach and joining 
gyms (in the health care realm) to buying GM cars — particularly if 
those requirements were necessary to the functioning of a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme.  Or, under Judge Steeh’s “economic deci-
sions” theory, Congress could tell people what to study in school or 
what job to take.  That may be the unfortunate state of the law as 
soon as next year — once the Supreme Court has weighed in, though I 
doubt it would ever go so far — but it is not up to district courts to ex-
tend constitutional doctrine on their own. 
A week later, however, Judge Roger Vinson issued his first ruling 
in the Florida case, echoing Judge Hudson in denying the govern-
ment’s motion to dismiss the challenges to the individual mandate — 
and also here to the new Medicaid rules (which the states had argued 
were coercive of their budgets and legislative prerogatives).52  “While 
the novel and unprecedented nature of the individual mandate does 
not automatically render it unconstitutional,” Judge Vinson observed, 
“there is perhaps a presumption that it is.”53  
Virginia’s and Florida’s lawsuits had been the most thoroughly 
briefed and argued, so the significant and lengthy opinions there con-
clusively established that the constitutional concerns being raised 
were serious.  The deliberate consideration that these district courts 
gave to those arguments (unlike the Judge Steeh’s perfunctory treat-
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ment) indicated that the probability that the Supreme Court would 
ultimately strike down the individual mandate — never a certainty, not 
even now — continued to increase. 
The pace of my debate tour was also increasing — as well as the 
media requests following each Obamacare ruling — beginning with a 
three-week West Coast swing that included events on other topics as 
well.  During my first-ever trip to Oregon in mid-October, I was part 
of a unique “MD-JD-PhD” panel at Lewis & Clark University Law 
School54 and gave an evening lecture in Portland that drew a nice 
crowd, including one of my judicial heroes, Ninth Circuit Judge Diar-
muid O’Scannlain.  My Willamette University event was less success-
ful, for reasons out of my control or that of the Federalist Society stu-
dent chapter that organized it.55  It was nothing I hadn’t encountered 
elsewhere in other contexts, but still unfortunate. 
My final West Coast Obamacare event was at Pacific University’s 
McGeorge Law School, sponsored by the Federalist Society and the 
school’s health law society.  More than 50 people, including faculty 
and people from the community, filled the room and spilled into the 
adjoining stairwell, to hear one of the sharpest debates in which I’ve 
participated.  Prof. John Sims, formerly of Public Citizen, went from 
patronizing my arguments, to assuring the crowd that Congress was 
merely solving a pressing national problem, to feigning disbelief at my 
statement that allowing the individual mandate would result in no 
principled limits on federal power (and then declining to specify what 
those limits might be).  The audience was not having any of it: by the 
end of the event my arguments seemed to have unsettled everyone, 
except perhaps a few aging hippies.  Several people came up to me 
afterwards saying I had won unanimously, that I had made many new 
Cato supporters, and that, effectively, the scales had fallen from their 
eyes on an issue they thought was just political mudslinging.56 
I had five more events before Thanksgiving, at the law schools of 
the University of Maryland, University of Alabama, Cumberland 
University, and University of Michigan, and, of course, the Florida 
International University symposium that spawned this article.  As part 
of Maryland’s 2010-11 Health Care Reform Speaker Series, I debated 
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Columbia law professor Gillian Metzger, who had filed and continues 
to file “constitutional law professors” amicus briefs in various Ob-
amacare cases.  For the first time, I faced a debate opponent who both 
took my arguments seriously and focused on the taxing power.57  The 
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause points were sol-
id, Metzger said in a formidable presentation, but the easiest way to 
win was to emphasize its (expansive) power to tax and spend for the 
general welfare. 
My Michigan debate against Nick Bagley, newly on the faculty 
after most recently working in the DOJ Civil Division’s appellate sec-
tion, was equally hard-hitting, though Bagley caricatured my position.  
More than 120 people attended — with a definite majority opposed to 
me, at least at the start — but the event almost didn’t come off because 
of a “Planes, Trains, and Automobiles” adventure that morning.  Af-
ter taking an early flight to Cleveland, my connecting flight to Flint 
kept getting pushed back for mechanical reasons — I jokingly blamed 
Flint native Michael Moore — until I decided to just rent a car and 
make the 2.5-hour drive to Ann Arbor.  I arrived half an hour late, 
missing most of Bagley’s presentation — which was predictable, so my 
rebuttal was unaffected — but later learned that the eventual connect-
ing flight would have caused me to miss the event entirely, thereby 
retroactively validating my transportation decision. 
Right after Thanksgiving, on November 30, a second district 
court ruled for the government.  In a lawsuit brought by Liberty Uni-
versity in Lynchburg, Judge Norman Moon found the individual 
mandate to be a lawful exercise of Congress’s powers under the 
Commerce Clause because 
individuals’ decisions about how and when to pay for health care 
are activities that in the aggregate substantially affect the inter-
state health care market. . . .  Far from ‘inactivity,’ by choosing to 
forgo insurance, Plaintiffs are making an economic decision to 
try to pay for health care services later, out of pocket, rather than 
now, through the purchase of insurance.  As Congress found, the 
total incidence of these economic decisions has a substantial im-
pact on the national market for health care by collectively shift-
ing billions of dollars on to other market participants and driving 
up the prices of insurance policies.58 
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This analysis echoed that of the Michigan judge in the Thomas More 
Law Center case — and is fatally flawed because everything is an “eco-
nomic decision” that “substantially affects the national market” in 
something.  
I made that point the very next day on a panel at the American 
Legislative Exchange Council’s annual policy summit, and again a few 
days later at the annual conference of the Council of State Govern-
ments.  The latter, held in Providence, featured a reprise of my debate 
with Gillian Metzger, though this time we were introduced by the 
governor of Rhode Island, Don Carcieri, and moderated by the gov-
ernor of Vermont, Jim Douglas.  Both of these events marked a fitting 
way to close out my public schedule for the year, as state legislators 
and executive officials began asking questions about the lawsuits and 
what kind of legal flexibility they had in implementing health care 
reform. 
But that wasn’t all that 2010 had in store for Obamacare litiga-
tion.  On December 13, Judge Hudson issued a second ruling in Vir-
ginia’s favor, striking down the individual mandate.59  “Yes, Virginia, 
there are limits on federal power,” I began my reaction.  “Today is a 
good day for liberty.  And a bad day for those who say that Congress 
is the arbiter of Congress’s powers.”60  Hudson thus vindicated the 
idea that ours is a government of enumerated and thus limited pow-
ers.  Even if the Supreme Court has broadened over the years the 
scope of congressional authority to legislate under the guise of regu-
lating commerce or to tax for the general welfare, “the constraining 
principles articulated in this line of cases . . . remains viable and appli-
cable to the immediate dispute.”61   
This was just one district court, but — far beyond arguments over 
whether the claims are political sour grapes — we could now see the 
day where this unprecedented assertion of federal power is definitive-
ly rejected as fundamentally contrary to our constitutional order.  As 
Judge Hudson said, “Despite the laudable intentions of Congress in 
enacting a comprehensive and transformative health care regime, the 
legislative process must still operate within constitutional bounds.  Sa-
lutatory goals and creative drafting have never been sufficient to off-
set an absence of enumerated powers.”62 
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Hudson’s ruling provoked a media feeding frenzy.  Over the next 
week, I provided commentary to more than 20 radio outlets and was 
invited on television networks as diverse as Al Jazeera, Fox News, and 
CNN.  For the latter, I went up to New York to appear on the short-
lived “Parker Spitzer” program opposite Slate columnist Dhalia Lith-
wick.63  It was fun — they even used my “broccoli” comment as the 
teaser leading into commercial before my segment — but not as much 
fun (let alone viewership) as the Colbert Report. 
Finally, a few days before Christmas, we filed our brief in the ap-
peal of the Michigan case to the Sixth Circuit.64  By this point, because 
the taxing power was falling decidedly flat in courts’ ears — not even 
courts’ ruling for the government on other grounds had accepted it — 
we decided to elaborate and refine our Necessary and Proper Clause 
analysis.  We argued that the outermost bounds of existing Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence — the “substantial effects doctrine” — also pro-
vided a way of considering the “necessity” prong of Necessary and 
Proper Clause analysis: 
The distinction between economic and non-economic activity al-
lowed the Court to determine when it was truly necessary to re-
gulate intrastate commerce without engaging in protracted, and 
arguably impossible, attempts to evaluate the “more or less ne-
cessity or utility” of a measure.  Alexander Hamilton, Opinion 
on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (February 23, 1791), 
in Legislative and Documentary History of the Bank of the Unit-
ed States 98 (H. St. Clair & D.A. Hall eds., reprinted Augustus 
M. Kelley 1967) (1832).  This Necessary and Proper doctrine lim-
its congressional power to regulating intrastate economic activity 
because this category of activity is closely connected to interstate 
commerce, without recognizing an implied federal power that 
would amount to a federal police power that the Supreme Court 
has always denied existed.  See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.  
Moreover, a power to regulate intrastate economic activity that 
has a substantial affect on interstate commerce is not so broad as 
to obstruct or supplant the states’ police powers.   
In other words, to preserve the constitutional scheme of limited 
and enumerated powers, the Court drew a judicially administra-
ble line beyond which Congress could not go in enacting “neces-
                                                                                                                           
 63 Ilya Shapiro discusses legal challenges to Obamacare on Parker Spitzer (CNN television 
broadcast Dec. 18, 2010), available at http://www.cato.org/mediahighlights/index.php? 
highlight_id=1598.  
 64 Brief of the Cato Institute and Prof. Randy E. Barnett as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Appellants, Thomas More Law Ctr v. Obama, No. 10-11156 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 2010).  
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sary and proper” means to execute its power to regulate inter-
state commerce.  The “substantial effects” doctrine, as limited in 
Lopez and Morrison, thus established the outer doctrinal bounds 
of “necessity” under the Necessary and Proper Clause.65 
These outer bounds prevent Congress from reaching intrastate non-
economic activity regardless of whether it substantially affects inter-
state commerce: 
With the individual mandate, Congress addressed the require-
ment that it confine itself to regulating economic activity by rede-
fining the word “activity” to include “decisions” or even “non-
actions.”  Yet the vital limiting principles on federal power can-
not be brushed away by recourse to the admitted importance of 
reforming health care or the cost-shifting aspects of that market.  
There is no “health care is different” constitutional exemption — 
and indeed Congress could have reformed the health care system 
in any number of ways that may have been better or worse as a 
matter of policy but would have been legally unassailable.  The 
reason for this lawsuit and dozens of others around the country, 
however, is that the health insurance mandate is supported by no 
Supreme Court precedent.  As one district court recently said 
while striking down the individual mandate, “Every application 
of Commerce Clause power found to be constitutionally sound 
by the Supreme Court involved some sort of action, transaction, 
or deed placed in motion by an individual or legal entity.”  Vir-
ginia v. Sebelius, [728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 781 (E.D. Va. 2010)]. 
If allowed to stand, the individual mandate would collapse the 
traditional distinction between acts and omissions by characteriz-
ing a failure to act as a “decision” not to act–thereby transform-
ing inactivity into activity by linguistic alchemy.  It would also 
then collapse the distinction between economic and non-
economic activity by characterizing an activity as “economic” not 
based on the type of activity it is but on whether it has any eco-
nomic effect.  Since any activity, in the aggregate, can be said to 
have an economic effect, the line the Court drew between activi-
ty that Congress can reach and that which is outside its powers 
would be destroyed.  The government’s novel theory would end 
our scheme of limited and enumerated powers, as well as erase 
the long-held constitutional distinction “between what is truly 
national and what is truly local.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (cit-
                                                                                                                           
 65 Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
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ing NLRB, 301 U.S. at 30).  All of this transgresses the current 
state of Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine.66 
Nor under existing law can Congress reach inactivity even if it 
purports to act pursuant to a broader regulatory scheme: 
The distinction between activity and inactivity provides the same 
type of judicially administrable limiting doctrine for what is “ne-
cessary” to execute the commerce power under an “essential to a 
broader regulatory scheme” theory as the economic/non-
economic distinction provides for the substantial effects doctrine.  
Now that Congress has, for the first time, sought to reach inactiv-
ity, all the Supreme Court need do is look back at its previous 
substantial effects doctrine cases, as it did in Lopez, to see that 
every case decided until now involved the regulation of activity, 
not inactivity. 
Limiting Congress to regulating or prohibiting activity under 
both the “substantial effects” and the “essential to a broader 
regulatory scheme” doctrines would serve the same purpose as 
the economic/non-economic distinction.  Such a formal limitation 
would help assure that exercises of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to execute the commerce power would be truly incidental 
to that power and not remote.  Doing nothing at all involves not 
entering into a literally infinite set of economic transactions.  
Giving a discretionary power over this set to Congress when it 
deems it essential to a regulation of interstate commerce would 
give Congress a plenary and unlimited police power over inac-
tion that is typically far remote from interstate commerce.  How-
ever imperfect, some such line must be drawn to preserve Article 
I’s scheme of limited and enumerated powers.  Because accept-
ing the government’s theory in this case would effectively demo-
lish that scheme, the government’s theory is unconstitutional.67 
Finally, even if not purchasing health insurance is considered an 
“economic activity” — which of course would mean that every aspect 
of human life is economic activity — there is no legal basis for Con-
gress to require individuals to enter the marketplace to buy a particu-
lar good or service.  Even the district court recognized that “in every 
Commerce Clause case presented thus far, there has been some sort 
of activity.  In this regard, the Health Care Reform Act arguably 
presents an issue of first impression.”68  And it is no more “proper” 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Id. at 12-14 (emphasis added). 
 67 Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added). 
 68 Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2010).  
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under the Necessary and Proper Clause for the federal government to 
“commandeer” individuals to execute federal regulation than to 
“commandeer” state officials: 
What very few mandates are imposed on the people by the fed-
eral government all rest on the fundamental pre-existing duties 
that citizens owe that government.  Such are the duties to register 
for the draft and serve in the armed forces if called, to sit on a 
federal jury, and to file a tax return.  See, e.g., Selective Draft Law 
Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918) (relying on the “supreme and 
noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor 
of the nation” to reject a claim founded on the Thirteenth 
Amendment).  In the United States, there is not even a duty to 
vote.  So there is certainly no comparable pre-existing “supreme 
and noble duty” to engage in economic activity when doing so is 
convenient to the regulation of interstate commerce. 
There are also pragmatic reasons to believe that the individual 
mandate is not “proper.”  In New York v. United States, Justice 
O’Connor explained that mandates on states are improper be-
cause, “where the Federal Government directs the States to re-
gulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public 
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulato-
ry program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifica-
tions of their decision.”  505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992).  That proposi-
tion applies to the commandeering of individuals as well: the in-
dividual mandate has allowed Congress and the president to es-
cape political accountability for increasing taxes on persons mak-
ing less than $250,000 per year by compelling them to make 
payments directly to private companies.  It is the evasion of that 
accountability that explains why the mandate was formulated as 
a regulatory “requirement” enforced by a monetary “penalty.”   
The individual mandate crosses a fundamental line between li-
mited constitutional government and limitless power cabined on-
ly by the vagaries of political will — which is to say, not cabined at 
all.  If the word “proper” is to be more than dead letter, it at least 
means that acts which destroy the very purpose of Article I — to 
enumerate and therefore limit the powers of Congress — are im-
proper.  If the federal power to enact “economic mandates” were 
upheld here, Congress would be free to require anything of the 
citizenry so long as it was in the name of a comprehensive regula-
tory plan.  Unsupported by any fundamental, preexisting, or tra-
ditional duty of citizenship, imposing “economic mandates” on 
the people is improper, both in the lay and constitutional senses 
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of that word.  Allowing Congress to exercise such power would 
turn “citizens” into “subjects.”69 
In short, the activity/inactivity distinction, like the economic/non-
economic distinction, provides a judicially administrable line by which 
some laws are deemed too remote from the commerce power — and 
thus resists making Congress’s enumerated powers into a plenary po-
lice power.70  Without it, no constitutional limits remain on federal 
power. 
VI.  TESTIMONY, DEBATE, OPINION, SATIRE 
The new year opened up a new front: testimony to state legisla-
tures grappling with Obamacare’s damage to their budgets and trying 
to implement their citizens’ consistent opposition to the individual 
mandate.  In light of November’s elections — which gave the balance 
of power in many places to Tea Party-supported Republicans — law-
makers in states with Democratic governors seemed especially keen 
to reinforce their ideas.  I thus submitted testimony to the Montana 
Senate Judiciary Committee in favor of joining the Florida-led law-
suit71 and to the Montana, Arkansas, and Ohio Houses of Representa-
tives, respectively, in support of those states’ Health Care Freedom 
Acts72 — simple pieces of legislation that preserve certain existing 
rights that individuals have regarding health care.73  And I wrote a 
letter to North Carolina Governor Beverly Perdue regarding the con-
stitutionality and desirability of the HCFA that her legislature 
passed.74 
                                                                                                                           
 69 Id. at 21-22. 
 70 See id. at 22-29. 
 71 Whether Montana Should Join the Florida-Led Lawsuit Challenging the Constitutionality 
of Obamacare Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 2011 Leg. 62nd Sess. (Mont. 2011) (written testi-
mony of Ilya Shapiro), available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12697. 
 72 On the Montana Health Care Freedom Act and Its Relationship to Obamacare Before the 
H.R., 2011 Leg. 62d Sess. (Mont. 2011) (written testimony of Ilya Shapiro), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12725; On the Arkansas Health Care Freedom Act 
and Its Relationship to Obamacare Before the H.R., 2011 Leg., 88th Sess. (Ark. 2011) (written 
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the Ohio Health Care Freedom Act and Its Relationship to Obamacare Before the H.R., 2011 Leg. 
129th Sess. (Ohio 2011) (written testimony of Ilya Shapiro), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12789. 
 73 See, e.g., Clint Bolick, The Health Care Freedom Act: Questions & Answers, 
GOLDWATER INST. (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/article/4371.  The Goldwa-
ter Institute was instrumental in drafting Arizona’s HCFA, which the American Legislative 
Exchange Council adopted as a model for legislators to pursue as constitutional amendments or 
statutes. 
 74 Letter from Ilya Shapiro, to Beverly Perdue, N.C. Governor, Regarding the Constitutio-
nality of North Carolina’s Health Care Freedom Act (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.cato.org/ 
pub_display.php?pub_id=12828. 
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In the first two months of 2011, I participated in seven public 
events relating to Obamacare, including debates at the University of 
Colorado-Boulder, Brigham Young University, Brooklyn Law School, 
the University of Akron, and the University of Arkansas,75 as well as a 
lecture at the University of Wyoming and a special debate panel at 
the American Medical Association’s National Advocacy Conference.76  
My first trip of the year took me to Colorado for the first time, begin-
ning with an unexpected weekend in Steamboat Springs.  There, the 
syndicated “Cari and Rob Show” let me use their guest condo for the 
weekend in exchange for my spending an hour in studio with them on 
Martin Luther King Day — which I did while still in ski attire.77  The 
next day, January 18, I had the first of what would be three debates 
against Colorado-Boulder law professor Scott Moss, who had just 
signed a statement released by the Center for American Progress at-
testing to the individual mandate’s constitutionality.78  Moss firmly 
emphasized the taxing power argument.  I retorted that the word 
“tax” does not appear in the section outlining the individual mandate 
or its associated penalty.  
Moreover, Congress is great at levying taxes.  It even levied “tax-
es” elsewhere in the Obamacare legislation — for example, on “high 
cost” employer-sponsored insurance plans (the so-called “Cadillac 
plans”)79 and on “indoor tanning services” (the “Snooki tax”)80 — so it 
presumably understands the distinction.  The health care legislation 
levied various “taxes” elsewhere in its provisions but the section that 
identified all the “revenue provisions” failed to include any reference 
to the insurance mandate.81  While Congress need not specify what 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Tracie Dugan, Legal Experts Argue Health-Care Overhaul, NWAONLINE.COM (Feb. 23, 
2011, 3:36 AM), http://www.nwaonline.com/news/2011/feb/23/legal-experts-argue-health-care-
overhaul-20110223/.  
 76 The latter presented the unusual spectacle of lawyers talking with doctors, though the 
handful of JD/MDs in the audience helped with translation.  See Nat’l Advocacy Conference 
Highlights, AM. MED. ASS’N (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/advocacy/get-
involved/national-advocacy-conference/highlights.shtml. 
 77 The Cari & Rob Show: Ilya Shapiro Discusses Repealing Obamacare (KRAI television 
broadcast Jan. 17, 2011), available at http://www.cato.org/mediahighlights/index.php? 
radio_id=1342.  
 78 Libby S. Adler, et al., Over 100 Law Professors Agree on Affordable Care Act’s Constitu-
tionality, CTR. AM. PROGRESS, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/01/pdf/law_ 
professors_ACA.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2011); see also Press Release, Ian Millhiser, Ctr. Am. 
Progress, Clearly Constitutional — A Primer on the Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act 
(Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/pressroom/releases/2011/01/ 
clearly_constitutional.html.  
 79 I.R.C. § 5000(A) (2010). 
 80 I.R.C. § 5000(B) (2010). 
 81 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 847-73 
(2010). 
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power it is exercising, there is no authority for courts to recharacterize 
a regulation as a tax when doing so is contrary to Congress’s express 
and actual regulatory purpose.82  Indeed, in this instance, the “hidden” 
justification — that the penalty is a tax — was specifically rejected by 
the president who signed the legislation.83 
Moss and I went back and forth for a while and eventually dis-
covered a shared penchant for quoting the TV show, “How I Met 
Your Mother.”  He urged the audience to “wait for it” before giving 
the point of his arguments, and I replied that, despite our differences 
on the legal interpretation, we agreed that when the Supreme Court 
ultimately ruled, it would be “legen . . . [took a sip of water] . . . 
dary.”84  Moss and I reprised our act two days later at BYU in front of 
about 200 people85 — so we each had a chance to appear before sympa-
thetic audiences — and would meet again at the University of Denver 
in April.86 
Soon after I returned from my mountain-state tour, a different 
sort of avalanche hit: On January 31, Judge Vinson, granting summary 
judgment to the Florida plaintiffs, ruled the individual mandate un-
constitutional and, finding that provision non-severable, struck down 
all of Obamacare.87  The ruling vindicated the constitutional first prin-
ciple that ours is a government of delegated, enumerated, and thus 
limited powers: 
[T]his case is not about whether the Act is wise or unwise legisla-
tion, or whether it will solve or exacerbate the myriad problems 
in our health care system.  In fact, it is not really about our health 
care system at all.  It is principally about our federalist system, 
and it raises very important issues regarding the Constitutional 
role of the federal government.88 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See, e.g., Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937) (“Inquiry into the hid-
den motives which may move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is 
beyond the competency of courts.”). 
 83 George Stephanopoulos, Obama: Mandate Is Not a Tax, ABC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2009, 9:00 
AM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/george/2009/09/obama-mandate-is-not-a-tax.html. 
 84 At that point, Moss yelled out from the side, “and look, we both suited up.’”  Suffice it 
to say, these are all catch-phrases from the clever CBS sitcom in which, inter alia, former child 
star Neil Patrick “Doogie Howser” Harris plays the caricature of a loveable lothario (and Harris 
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 85 For debate video, see The Constitutionality and Proposed Repeal of Obamacare, 
http://www.law2.byu.edu/videos_index/Federalist%20society%201-20-11.wmv. 
 86 Alas, Moss did not “suit up” for this last debate of our series. 
 87 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV-EMT, 2011 WL 
285683, at *40-41 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).  
 88 Id. at *1. 
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Like Judge Hudson in the Virginia case, Judge Vinson recog-
nized that the individual mandate represents an unprecedented and 
improper constitutional incursion: the federal government, under the 
guise of regulating commerce, cannot require that people engage in 
economic activity: 
It would be a radical departure from existing case law to hold 
that Congress can regulate inactivity under the Commerce 
Clause.  If it has the power to compel an otherwise passive indi-
vidual into a commercial transaction with a third party merely by 
asserting . . . that compelling the actual transaction is itself 
“commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects in-
terstate commerce” [see Act § 1501(a)(1)], it is not hyperbolizing 
to suggest that Congress could do almost anything it wanted. . . .  
If Congress can penalize a passive individual for failing to engage 
in commerce, the enumeration of powers in the Constitution 
would have been in vain for it would be “difficult to perceive any 
limitation on federal power” [Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564], and we 
would have a Constitution in name only.89 
The government’s argument that health care is “unique” was not 
effective because “there are lots of markets — especially if defined 
broadly enough — that people cannot ‘opt out’ of.”90  “Uniqueness is 
not an adequate limiting principle as every market problem is, at 
some level and in some respects, unique.”91 
Unpersuasive also was the claim that not buying health insurance 
is an “economic decision” that, in the aggregate, substantially affects 
interstate commerce: 
The problem with this legal rationale, however, is it would essen-
tially have unlimited application.  There is quite literally no deci-
sion that, in the natural course of events, does not have an eco-
nomic impact of some sort.  The decisions of whether and when 
(or not) to buy a house, a car, a television, a dinner, or even a 
morning cup of coffee also have a financial impact that — when 
aggregated with similar economic decisions — affect the price of 
that particular product or service and have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.92 
                                                                                                                           
 89 Id. at *22 (emphasis added). 
 90 Id. at *24 (giving the food market as an example; invoking the broccoli and GM-car 
hypotheticals).  
 91 Id. at *25.  
 92 Id. at *27 (emphasis in bold added). 
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Not even the Necessary and Proper Clauses saves the individual 
mandate because this clause  
cannot be utilized to ‘pass laws for the accomplishment of ob-
jects’ that are not within Congress’ enumerated powers. . . .  To 
uphold that provision via application of the Necessary and Prop-
er Clause would authorize Congress to reach and regulate far 
beyond the currently established ‘outer limits’ of the Commerce 
Clause and effectively remove all limits on federal power.93 
Judge Vinson then declined to sever the individual mandate from 
the rest of the legislation, or determine which other sections must fall 
with it because “[g]oing through the 2,700-page Act line-by-line, inva-
lidating dozens (or hundreds) of some sections while retaining dozens 
(or hundreds) of others . . . would, in the end, be tantamount to re-
writing a statute in an attempt to salvage it,” which courts cannot do.94  
“It would be impossible to ascertain on a section-by-section basis if a 
particular statutory provision could stand (and was intended by Con-
gress to stand) independently of the individual mandate.”95  And so,  
notwithstanding the fact that many of the provisions in the Act 
can stand independently without the individual mandate (as a 
technical and practical matter), it is reasonably ‘evident,’ as I 
have discussed above, that the individual mandate was an essen-
tial and indispensable part of the health reform efforts, and that 
Congress did not believe other parts of the Act could (or it 
would want them to) survive independently.96 
Judge Vinson emphasized that the case was “not about whether 
the Act is wise or unwise legislation.  It is about the Constitutional 
role of the federal government.”97  In feeling obligated to strike down 
all of Obamacare due to its singular fatal flaw, Vinson noted “that 
while the individual mandate was clearly ‘necessary and essential’ to 
the Act as drafted, it is not ‘necessary and essential’ to health care 
reform in general.  It is undisputed that there are various other (Con-
stitutional) ways to accomplish what Congress wanted to do.”98 
While the practical effect of the ruling was disputed,99 the fact 
that the judicial branch was checking the legislative branch’s assertion 
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 94 Id. at *38. 
 95 Id.  
 96 Id. at *39. 
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of power was clear enough.  And this is as it should be: If the only 
limit on federal power were Congress’s own assessment of the wisdom 
of each assertion of such power, the Constitution would be obsolete.  
James Madison, the author of the Federalist Paper No. 51 explaining 
how man’s non-angelic nature requires explicit limits on those who 
govern, would spin in his grave.100  As even would Alexander Hamil-
ton — perhaps the Framer most favorably disposed to strong central 
power — who cautioned that courts should not be in the business of 
evaluating the “more or less necessity” of a piece of legislation but 
rather define judicially administrable rules to guide (but also limit) 
Congress’s actions.101  The ruling, in a lawsuit that now had 26 states as 
plaintiffs — with two others making separate challenges — thus 
represented the most significant victory for federalism in this saga.  It 
was again but one district court, but the tide was running in freedom’s 
favor. 
Not everyone saw it my way, of course, but Vinson’s ruling did 
get major attention.  The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing 
on the constitutionality of Obamacare102 — one result of which was 
Randy Barnett being attacked by the New York Times.103  The House 
would follow suit,104 again bringing in Randy but also calling as a wit-
ness Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli, who had just recently 
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EMT (N.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2011). 
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Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (statement of Rep. Trent Franks), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/news/ 
ChairmanStatement02162011.html. 
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filed a petition for expedited Supreme Court review of Judge Hud-
son’s ruling.105 
Yale law professor Akhil Amar, one of the nation’s leading con-
stitutional scholars and a “progressive originalist” of sorts — he joined 
Randy and others on a brief supporting our view of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause in McDonald106 — published a fiery op-ed in the 
L.A. Times.107  Among other charges, Amar said his students unders-
tood the Constitution better than Vinson, likened the judge to his 
namesake Roger Taney (the Chief Justice who wrote the infamous 
Dred Scott opinion), and — most outrageously as a matter of legal ar-
gument — that breathing is an action subject to federal regulation!  A 
reader of Cato’s blog wrote in to say that this latter point reminded 
him of that classic song by the Police, “Every Breath You Take.”  
What’s ironic about this comment, perhaps inadvertently, is that the 
whole Obamacare battle boils down to competing views of federal 
power: Does the government have a general “police” power or is it 
limited to those powers listed in the Constitution?  Feeling cheeky, I 
updated the song for our favorite constitutional debate: 
 
Every breath you take 
Every move you make, or 
Decide not to take 
Even when you flake 
We’re mandating you 
 
Every single day 
Every word you say 
Every game you play 
Even if you stay 
We’re coercing you 
 
O don’t you fuss 
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news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-amar-health-care-legal-20110206,0,1370439.story.  More than 
fiery, I’d say the mild-mannered Amar was uncharacteristically intemperate.  For more detailed 
criticism than I provide here, see Timothy Sandefur, Akhil Amar’s Embarrassing Attempt to 
Defend Obamacare, PLF LIBERTY BLOG (Feb. 6, 2011, 4:37 PM), http://plf.typepad.com/ 
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You belong to us 
How we regulate every step you take 
 
Every move you make 
Every vow you break 
Every smile you fake 
Every claim you stake 
We’re mandating you 
 
The Constitution’s lost without a trace 
Since ’37 we go every place 
Limits on government you can’t replace 
Got rid of those so we’re always in your face 
We’re commanding you, no saying please 
 
Every move you make 
Every vow you break 
Every smile you fake 
Every claim you stake 
We’re mandating you108 
 
And Akhil Amar wasn’t the only academic giant weighing in 
against the Vinson ruling.  Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe, 
liberal lion and one of the “deans” of constitutional law (who is even 
found in the pages of the Cato Supreme Court Review)109 wrote an op-
ed for the New York Times:  
Since the New Deal, the court has consistently held that Con-
gress has broad constitutional power to regulate interstate com-
merce.  This includes authority over not just goods moving across 
state lines, but also the economic choices of individuals within 
states that have significant effects on interstate markets.  By that 
standard, this law’s constitutionality is open and shut.  Does any-
one doubt that the multitrillion-dollar health insurance industry 
is an interstate market that Congress has the power to regu-
late?110 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Ilya Shapiro, The Federal Government’s Police Power, CATO @ LIBERTY (Feb. 14, 2011, 
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This time, instead of playing at satire, I wrote a letter to the editor.111 
A week later, I gave a lecture at the fourth annual International 
Students for Liberty Conference, which attracted over 500 libertarian 
student activists.112  I humbly channeled Roger Pilon in a 45-minute 
lecture that covered the basics of political philosophy, rights theory, 
and American constitutionalism — tying those themes together with 
reference to Obamacare in an attempt to answer the question, “are 
there any limits on federal power?” 
A week after that, again on the last day of the month, a judge 
very different from Roger Vinson answered that question in the nega-
tive.  Judge Gladys Kessler of the D.C. district court opined that the 
power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to regulate 
“mental activity, i.e., decision-making.”113  The activity/inactivity dis-
tinction is “of little significance” because “[i]t is pure semantics to 
argue that an individual who makes a choice to forgo health insurance 
is not ‘acting’. . . .  Making a choice is an affirmative action, whether 
one decides to do something or not to do something.”114 
As Randy Barnett said in an emailed press statement,  
This decision makes crystal clear that the government is seeking 
the dangerous and unprecedented power to regulate the eco-
nomic “decisions” of all Americans — including the decision to 
refrain from engaging in economic activity.  If allowed by the Su-
preme Court, Americans would be reduced from citizens to the 
subjects of Congress, which would now have the discretionary 
power to run their lives.115 
Indeed, Judge Kessler’s logic vindicates the “parade of horribles” 
(as they’ve been described by Obamacare proponents) that those on 
my side have raised as examples of what the government could do if 
the individual mandate passed constitutional muster.  Judge Vinson 
had seen this danger: 
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The important distinction is that “economic decisions” are a 
much broader and far-reaching category than are “activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.”  While the latter nec-
essarily encompasses the first, the reverse is not true.  “Econom-
ic” cannot be equated to “commerce.”  And “decisions” cannot 
be equated to “activities.”  Every person throughout the course 
of his or her life makes hundreds or even thousands of life deci-
sions that involve the same general sort of thought process that 
the defendants maintain is “economic activity.”  There will be no 
stopping point if that should be deemed the equivalent of activity 
for Commerce Clause purposes.116 
Vinson’s is a vision diametrically opposed to Kessler’s.  As the 
Wall Street Journal put it, “Judge Kessler has shown that the real de-
bate is between a government of limited and enumerated powers as 
understood by the Founders, and a government whose reach includes 
mental activity.’”117 
VII.  NON-CONCLUSION 
The debate has certainly shifted.  Where once Obamacare’s de-
fenders said it began and ended with health care clearly being com-
merce — and constitutional lawsuits were frivolous and partisan — 
they’ve since cycled through the taxing power and Necessary and 
Proper Clause, only to resort to ad hominem rants about overturning 
the New Deal and “Lochnerism.”118  In briefing at the appellate stage, 
meanwhile, the government has all but abandoned the once-favored 
tax arguments — having gone 0-for-6 in district courts, including Judge 
Kessler.119  And instead of framing the activity regulated by the indi-
vidual mandate as the “economic decision” not to buy insurance, 
Congress is now allegedly regulating “the practice of obtaining health 
care services without insurance, a practice that shifts significant health 
care costs to other participants in the health care market.”120  (Under 
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this theory, however, one could refrain from buying insurance by re-
fraining from using medical services — but this option is not allowed 
under the statute, except for certain religious objectors.)  Stay tuned 
on that front, as both sides refine the nuances of their positions and 
the case law on which they rely.  Lawyers and media alike nervously 
anticipated the appellate arguments that were to be heard in the 
Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits in May-June 2011, and in the 
D.C. Circuit in September.121  Given the Supreme Court’s denial of 
Virginia’s petition for expedited review, observers eagerly awaited the 
appellate decisions that were expected in late summer or early fall.122 
My personal tour, meanwhile, continued apace — I should make t-
shirts — with spring 2011 events in Indianapolis, New Orleans, Dela-
ware, New York,123 Alabama, and Kentucky (where I missed one of 
my events due to the longest TSA-screening lines I’ve ever seen, in 
Houston the morning after the Final Four NCAA basketball cham-
pionship).  I also had a highly anticipated debate against Yale law pro-
fessor Jack Balkin at UCLA on St. Patrick’s Day — where both of us 
spoke without notes from arm chairs and Balkin unveiled the novel 
theory that the individual mandate penalty was actually a “duty” that 
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the government could lawfully assess under Article I, section 8.  The 
following month, I faced, together with my nominal doppelganger, 
George Mason law professor Ilya Somin, Balkin’s colleague Akhil 
Amar and NYU’s Rick Hills in a four-way “Oxford-style” debate at 
Amherst College.  Amar threw out some bizarre arguments relating 
to public vaccination and national security, as well as arguing from the 
U.S. News rankings that no professor from a top-10 law school other 
than Richard Epstein supported “the Ilyas.”124  I rounded out the aca-
demic year at the University of Richmond Law School, where Virgin-
ia Delegate Joe Morrissey seemed to want to debate whether Obama-
care was “good” and argued that because it was, it had to be constitu-
tional.125 
As I submitted the final substantive revision of this article, exact-
ly a year had passed since my first Obamacare debate, the one against 
my former professor at the University of Chicago Law School.  What 
a year it was, certainly not one I could have predicted when I was 
starting out at Cato.  I suppose one could say that mine is one job the 
Obama administration has saved or created, and that Obamacare 
could also be called the “Legal Pundit Full Employment Act.”  On 
top of the wonderful, frustrating, and above all tiring experiences, my 
first year battling Obamacare provided a tremendous education in 
constitutional law and politics, and also in human psychology. 
All the Obamacare legal challenges boil down to Congress’s au-
thority — or lack thereof — to require people to buy private insurance.  
Although unfortunately not dispositive of modern judicial decisions, 
the text of the Constitution demands that the Supreme Court strike 
down the individual mandate as an unconstitutional exercise of Con-
gress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.  Finding the mandate 
constitutional would be the first interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause to permit the regulation of inactivity — in effect requiring an 
individual to engage in an economic transaction.  Upholding Obama-
care would grant the federal government wide latitude to mandate 
that Americans engage in activities of the government’s choosing.  An 
expansive holding here would fundamentally alter the relationship of 
the federal government to the states and the people.  If the legal chal-
lenges fail, there will be no principled limits on federal power. 
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But will the Court go there, striking down such a large and im-
portant piece of legislation, the cornerstone of the Obama administra-
tion’s domestic policy?  On the one hand, the Court refrained from 
striking down such facially unconstitutional pieces of fundamental 
legislation as Social Security.  On the other, that legislation was large-
ly popular, and came during a time of great social upheaval.  If, as the 
old saw goes, “the Court follows the election returns,” the “shellack-
ing” the Democrats received in November 2010 may have steeled the 
spine of justices inclined to overturn Obamacare.  In particular, if the 
conventional wisdom is correct that Justice Anthony Kennedy will be 
the swing vote in a 5-4 decision, then he may be swayed by what the 
American people seem to think is a gross infringement on liberty. 
The only precise prediction I will make is that, whatever the ul-
timate result is of these lawsuits, the Supreme Court will not issue a 
decision ratifying a more expansive use of the commerce power than 
it did in Raich.  It will either strike down this law or find some way to 
avoid the merits while effectively allowing the individual mandate to 
stand. 
